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Coleman: Criminal Law - A New Means to Combat Child Abuse?

CRIMINAL LAW-A NEW MEANS TO COMBAT CHILD
ABUSE? State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
INTRODUCTION

Recently child abuse has been brought forcefully to society's
attention and the nation has become aware of the severity and the
pervasiveness of the problem. Only now are efforts being made to
combat the incidents and results of such abuse, through social services, courts, counseling, and other available means. The legal system has also recognized the problem and dealt with it in its own
manner.
In the past parents were not held criminally or civilly liable
for their failure to act in caring for their children.1 Liability was
imposed only in those instances where "criminal liability would
have existed absent the parent-child relationship."'2 Before the legislatures enacted child abuse and neglect statutes, a parent could
raise his children as he believed appropriate, but was never permitted to inflict serious harm on his child in the guise of punishment.8
The child could not sue his parent civilly for injuries inflicted by
the parent due to the intra-family immunity doctrine.4
Yet, in the 1960's and 1970's legislatures, through child abuse
and neglect statutes, clarified and made enforceable the duty of
the parent to protect his children from harm or abuse. 5 In North
Carolina and in most states, the statutes impose a criminal penalty
for abuse and also punish the failure to prevent abuse, which was
not previously a crime. e In addition, many states have imposed liability by abrogating the intra-family immunity doctrine almost en1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981), (G.S. 14-316.1 says
that any one who knowingly or willfully causes a juvenile to be in a place or condition, or commit an act whereby he could be adjudicated delinquent or abused
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. G.S. 14-318.2 says any parent of a minor child
who inflicts physical injury or allows injury to be inflicted, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. G.S. 14-318.4 says any parent who intentionally inflicts serious injury upon a child is guilty of a class I felony.); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS §

122 (4th ed. 1971).

2. Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (1978).
3. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 11 & 12 (1978).
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981).
6. Id.

415
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 6
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:415

tirely, or at least in cases of gross negligence or willful abuse of the
child.7
In State v. Walden, a mother was convicted of assault with a
deadly weapon inflicting serious bodily injury, for failing to intervene when her boyfriend assaulted her child.8 The court found that
her nonfeasance was criminal, and was equivalent to aiding and
abetting or encouraging the perpetrator of a crime. 9 In most states,
aiders and abettors are indicted and punished as principals. 10
Until recently, under general tort law a minor child could not
sue his parent for personal torts, whether intentional or negligent.11 The reason for this rule was to guarantee family harmony
and to maintain parental discipline within the home.12 But the
parent does have a legal duty to protect his children from any
harm which he should have been aware of when exercising ordinary care."3 Early criminal law also recognized this legal duty.'
The Walden court indicated that a breach of this duty can lead to
criminal sanction,"' in that a parent must attempt to prevent
abuse of his children if he has a reasonable opportunity to do so
and a failure to do so is criminally punishable. North Carolina,
through N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-318.2, already requires parents to
protect their children from harm, but the Walden decision appears
to require more.' 6 Now, rather than merely attempting to protect
the child, it appears a parent must take all reasonable steps to prevent the abuse if he is present when it occurs, or he will be found
to have acquiesced in the criminal intent of the perpetrator of the
harm and thus be guilty as a principal.' 7 The criminal law has
finally begun to parallel the civil law in holding the parent liable
for child abuse, whether done by the parent himself or by someone
standing in loco parentis. 8
This note will examine Walden in light of prior North Caro7. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 127 (1978).
8. 306 N.C. 466, 293 S.E.2d 780 (1982).
9. Id; see also State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 720, 224 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1976).
10. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 85 (1961).
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
12. Id.
13. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 144 (1978).
14. Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L. J. 590 (1958).
15. 306 N.C. at 473, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981).
17. 306 N.C. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/6
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lina law, in relation to the new law it creates, as well as the policy
interests involved in this area of criminal liability. 19
THE CASE

A neighbor of the defendant, who lived in an adjoining apartment, testified that on December 8, 1979, he heard a child crying
and a popping sound he believed to be that of a child being
beaten. 0 The noises continued for several hours and began again
the next morning.21 The neighbor called the police who came and
questioned the neighbor and the woman in the apartment where
the defendant lived; the police officers then went to obtain a search
warrant.2 2 When the police returned, they observed five children
with cuts and bruises on their bodies, huddled in a corner of the
apartment.2 3
The defendant, the mother of the children, was indicted for
assault with a deadly weapon, inflicting serious bodily injury, in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.24 The children testified that
Bishop Hoskins, who lived with them and their mother, had previously beaten all of them, and had beaten one child, Lamont, the
morning of December 8th with a leather belt.28 Each child said
that during the beating that morning their mother was in the room
with Bishop and Lamont, but did not say anything or do anything
to stop the beating. 26 The defendant testified that the children's
father, not Bishop, had forced his way into the apartment and
beaten the child over her objections.2 7 The defendant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to five to ten years in prison.2 8 The
court of appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could convict the defendant if they
19. Another important issue in this case was whether the trial court should
have denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case because of the Speedy
Trial Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-701 (Cum. Supp. 1981). This issue is beyond the
scope of this note and will not be discussed here, but the supreme court held that
there was no error in the trial court on this issue.
20. 306 N.C. at 469, 293 S.E.2d at 782.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 470, 293 S.E.2d at 783.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 469, 293 S.E.2d at 782.
25. Id. at 470, 293 S.E.2d at 783.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 469, 293 S.E.2d at 782.
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found "that she was present with the reasonable opportunity and
duty to prevent the crime and failed to take reasonable steps to do
so.''29 The court of appeals ordered a new trial based on these errors.3 0 The supreme court reversed and sent the case back with orders to reinstate the trial court's verdict. 3 1 The court held that a
parent's failure to take all reasonably possible steps to protect his
child, while he is present, from an attack by another person constitutes an omission by the parent indicating his consent and contribution to the crime being committed. 32 Thus, the parent is guilty
as an aider and abettor."
BACKGROUND

North Carolina's law on aiding and abetting and the development of the laws relating to child abuse by parents have followed
substantially the same course as the law in other jurisdictions. '
A.

North Carolina Law

In North Carolina, the mere presence of the defendant at the
scene of the crime is rarely sufficient for the defendant to be found
guilty as an aider and abettor to the crime." Since as early as 1849,
North Carolina courts have required that the defendant at least
contribute in some way to the commission of the crime.36 The intention to assist in the crime had to be communicated to the perpetrator for the defendant to be held guilty.37 He could be found
guilty if he in some way encouraged the perpetrator of the crime,
even though he did not actually participate in its commission.3 '
Yet, if the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator, and knows that
29. Id. at 471, 293 S.E.2d at 784.
30. State v. Walden, 53 N.C. App. 196, 280 S.E.2d 505 (1981).
31. 306 N.C. at 479, 293 S.E.2d at 788.
32. Id. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787. (In this note, the terms "principal" and
"aider and abettor" are synonymous.)
33. Id.
34. People v. Bunting, 104 Ill.
App. 3d 291, 432 N.E.2d 950 (1982) (accomplice accountability); Bigbee v. State, 173 Ind. App. 3d 462, 364 N.E.2d 149 (1977)
(aiding and encouraging); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E.2d 185 (1976) (aiding and abetting); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981).
35. State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 249 S.E.2d 429 (1978); State v. Rankin,
284 N.C. 219, 200 S.E.2d 182 (1973).
36. State v. Hildreth, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 440, 444 (1849).
37. State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 415, 121 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1961).
38. State v. Aycoth, 272 N.C. 48, 51, 157 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1967).
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his presence will be regarded as encouragement, then his presence
alone is sufficient for conviction of the bystander.3 9 Even when the
courts have deemed presence a contribution to the commission of
the crime, they have imposed the requirement that the bystander
have knowledge that his presence will be regarded as encouragement by the perpetrator. 0 Therefore, a friendly relationship between the bystander and the perpetrator, standing alone is ordinarily insufficient to hold the bystander guilty as an aider and
abettor. 1
Before Walden, no criminal case in North Carolina had held
that a parent had an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to
protect his child from harm. However, one case did hold that it is
the moral and legal duty of the father to provide for the protection, maintenance, and education of his children."' Similar duties
are now required by statute.'3 State v. Cauley," a North Carolina
case similar to Walden, upheld a verdict finding the mother of an
abused child guilty of aiding and abetting her husband in committing assault with a deadly weapon on the defendant wife's three
year old child. The mother was in the room during the commission
of the assault, and she was found to have encouraged the perpetrator by laughing, cursing, and telling the child to walk.' 5 Yet, the
court in Cauley did not discuss the parent's duty to her child.
Walden can be distinguished from Cauley because in Walden the
defendant failed to do or say anything. This difference is significant because the Walden court interpreted silence as encouragement to the perpetrator, which no previous North Carolina court
39. State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 720, 224 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1976); State v.
Horgett 255 N.C. 412, 415, 121 S.E.2d 589, 592 (1961).
40. 255 N.C. at 415, 121 S.E.2d at 592 (quoting State v. Holland, 211 N.C.
284, 189 S.E. 761 (1937)).
41. 289 N.C. at 720, 224 S.E.2d at 190. (This was a homicide case in which
the husband of the defendant was murdered by the defendant and her boyfriend
was present at the time the crime was committed but he did not give any assistance nor was there evidence that he knew that his presence would be seen as
encouragement. The court held that his motion for nonsuit should have been
granted.)
42. In Re TenHoopen, 202 N.C. 223, 226, 162 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1932). The
TenHoopen Court cites in support of this proposition Newsome v. Bunch, 144
N.C. 15, 56 S.E. 509 (1907); In Re Turner, 151 N.C. 474, 66 S.E. 431 (1909); In Re
Means, 176 N.C. 307, 97 S.E. 39 (1918).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981).
44. State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).
45. Id. at 710, 94 S.E.2d at 922.
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had done.
North Carolina has generally followed the majority of states,
both in enacting the reporting statutes and other child abuse statutes,46 and in beginning to abrogate the parent-child immunity
which in the past prevented children from suing their parents for
harm caused by the parents' ordinary negligence. 47 In North Carolina, until fairly recently, an unemancipated child could not maintain an action against his parent based on ordinary negligence.48
This rule extended to a step-parent standing in loco parentis.49 In
1975 the North Carolina Legislature enacted a statute which remains the state's only abrogation of the parent-child immunity.50
This statute allows the child to sue the parent when the parent's
negligent. operation of a motor vehicle causes the child injury.5"
Only when the child is injured by such negligence can he sue his
parent in North Carolina. Parents have only been criminally liable
for injuries they cause their children when the injury was reported
to the local state prosecutor who could then bring charges against
the parent for assault or other applicable crimes. The misdemeanor child abuse statute is the only punishment available for
failure to prevent abuse, regardless of the severity of the child's
*
52
injury.
B.

Other States

Most states have now enacted child abuse and neglect statutes
similar to the North Carolina statutes. 53 The law on aiding and
abetting is also substantially similar. 54 Mere presence at the scene
of the crime or acquiescence in the commission of a crime have
been held insufficient to constitute aiding and abetting under most
46. National Study of the Incidence and Severity of Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1981 p.'.
47. Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981).
48. Morgan v. Johnson, 24 N.C. App. 307, 308, 210 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1974).
49 Id.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.21 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
51. Snow v. Nixon, 52 N.C. App. 131, 133, 277 S.E.2d 850, 851 (1981).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981); Child Abuse and Neglect,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2054, 2368 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3
(1980).
54. People v. Bunting, 104 Ill. App. 3d 291, 432 N.E.2d 950 (1982); Bigbee v.
State, 173 Ind. App. 3d 462, 364 N.E.2d 149 (1977); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 85
(1961).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/6
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circumstances. 55
Mere presence may be sufficient for conviction when it is regarded by the perpetrator as encouragement, especially when the
bystander is present and fails to disapprove or oppose the crime.56
Lack of disapproval may be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether that person assented to the criminal act. 57 The
bystander thereby aids and abets the crime by lending his countenance and approval.56 In Walden the mother gave such criminal
approval. In its charge to the jury, the trial court stated that the
jury could find the defendant guilty if they found that she was present when the crime was committed and that her failure to respond encouraged Hoskins to commit the crime.59 The supreme
court in Walden stated that the parent's failure to take reasonable
steps to prevent the abuse showed the parent's consent and contribution to the crime, 0 thus consistently holding with recent case
law in other states.61
Another exception to the rule that mere presence at the scene
of the crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting
arises when the bystander has a legal duty to the victim of the
crime.62 The common law imposes certain duties upon persons
standing in personal relationships to others, and action may be required by these persons to protect others against threatened acts
by third persons.6 One of these relationships is that of parent and
child, and a parent may be guilty of a crime by failing to act in a
64
hazardous situation.

55. Pruitt v. State, 166 Ind. App. 67, 333 N.E.2d 874, 881 (1975). (Negative
acquiescence is not specifically defined in the case law but can be said to mean
that the bystander does nothing to aid in the commission of the crime but merely
stands by passively.)
56. People v. Gray, 87 Ill. App. 3d 142, 408 N.E.2d 1150, 1154 (1980). (The
court held that proof of common purpose could be inferred from the accused's
presence at the commission of the crime, without opposing the crime.)
57. People v. Reed, 104 Ill. App. 3d 331, 432 N.E.2d 979, 985 (1982); Mobley
v. State, 227 Ind. 335, 85 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1949).

58. Id.
59. 306 N.C. at 471, 293 S.E.2d at 784.
60. Id at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
61. 104 Ill. App. 3d 331, 432 N.E.2d at 985; 227 Ind. 335, 85 N.E.2d at 492.
62. State v. Smolin, 221 Kan. 149, 557 P.2d 1241, 1246 (1976).
63. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW at 597 (2d ed. 1969). W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26, at 184 (1972).

64. W.

LAFAVE,

supra note 63. (No North Carolina case had held this way in

a criminal case.)
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The Walden court found an Australian case, Rex v. Russel,65
persuasive on the issue of the legal duty of the parent to the child.
In Rex v. Russell, the father did not attempt to interfere when his
wife drowned herself and their two young sons. The Australian
court held that a parent has a moral duty to protect his children
from harm, and the father's failure to intervene could be seen as
indicating his assent and encouragement to his wife's conduct."

The court upheld the father's conviction as an aider and abettor to
manslaughter.6 The defendant had a duty to act affirmatively and
take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent the commission of
the crime.68 Failure to do so established his guilt."
Other states' courts have held that a parent must act to protect his child from abuse. In State v. Zobel,70 the Supreme Court
of South Dakota held that the parent cannot refuse to help his
children when it is reasonably within his power to do so. In Zobel
the wife had previously been convicted of assaulting her children
and the husband told the court when she received probation that
he would prevent her from assaulting the children again.1 But
while the husband was out of the house, the wife seriously assaulted both children, and when the husband returned one of the
children was dead." The court upheld the husband's conviction of
second degree manslaughter on the ground that by his failure to
intervene, to protect the children, and to see that the children got
enough food and adequate medical attention, he became a party to
his wife's actions.73 Although the Zobel holding is similar to that in
Walden, the facts of the two cases are different in that in Walden
the mother was at home, and in the room when her child was assaulted. The Zobel court implied that because the father knew of
his wife's past abuse of the children, he should not have allowed
them to be put in a situation where they could be harmed.
Walden, as did Zobel, held that a parent must take all reasonable
steps to protect his child from assault and cannot passively observe
65. Rex v. Russell, [1933] VIcT. L. R. 59 (Aus. 1932) (seriatim opinion).
66. Id. at 67.

67. Id. at 83.
68. Id. at 76.

69. Id.
70. 81 S.D. 260, 134 N.W.2d 101 (1965).

71. Id. at 103.
72. Id. at 104.
73. Id. at 108.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/6

8

1983]

Coleman: Criminal Law - A New Means to Combat Child Abuse?
CHILD ABUSE

the assault. 4 Yet Walden did not discuss whether the mother
should have removed her children from an environment where they
were in danger of abuse from Hoskins as a part of the parental
duty to protect her child.
In Smith v. State,78 a recent Indiana case, the Indiana Court
of Appeals held that a parent is charged with an affirmative duty
to care for his child, and the absence of actual knowledge that danger may exist is no defense because the parent has an affirmative
duty to discover any danger, and then act in a reasonable manner.
In Smith, the defendant was the mother of the child. 6 She was
present while her boyfriend abused the child and did nothing to
intervene except protest verbally. The court held that a parent
has a duty to keep his child from dangerous situations, and to remove the child from such situations.78 The defendant's felony con-

viction for child neglect was upheld because of her failure to remove the child from the dangerous situation.7

9

The Walden court

did not say, as did Smith, that the parent has an affirmative duty
to discover possible danger, but did hold that parents must act
reasonably under the circumstances of each case to prevent harm
to their children. 0
According to early tort law, minor children could not sue their
parents for intentional or negligent torts.81 Courts have begun to
make inroads upon this immunity, and one of the first changes allows the child to recover when his parent intentionally or wilfully
inflicts injuries upon him.82 The recent trend regarding parentchild immunity has been complete abrogation, except as to exercises of parental control and authority, or parental discretion with
respect to such matters as food and care. 83
Parents have always had the privilege of disciplining their
74. 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
75. Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. App. 1980); accord, Eaglen v. State,
249 Ind. 144, 231 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1967).
76. 408 N.E.2d at 617.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 622.
79. Id.
80. 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
81. W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 122 (4th ed. 1971).

82. Id.
83. Id. (Even with this exception, under the facts in Walden the parent
might have been immune from suit if she had claimed that she was exercising
discretion as to the child's care.)
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983
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children, and were allowed to use reasonable force in doing so.8
The privilege includes using any corporal punishment which is reasonable under the circumstances.85 But the parent cannot in punishing his child, inflict cruel and abusive punishment without losing his parental privilege. 86 If the parent loses his privilege of
discipline, he is then subject to criminal sanctions.87
In addition to the disciplinary privilege, parents are allowed to
exercise broad authority and discretion in the raising of their children.88 Because the judiciary is reluctant to interfere with family
autonomy,89 the courts will interfere with this discretion only when
necessary for the protection of the children. 90 Generally the standard of care to which the parent is held in the care of his child is
that of a reasonable parent, considering his special relationship to
the child. 9 A parent can be found civilly liable for failure to exercise reasonable care for the child's protection against unreasonable
risk of injury.92 In determining whether or not the parent is liable
for such failure, all circumstances will be considered, including the
likelihood of the child's recognition of the possible risk of injury to
himself and whether or not such injury was reasonably foreseeable
to his parent.98 Thus parents do have some obligation under the
civil law to protect their children from harm, and in many states,
can now be sued by their children for damages. 94
ANALYSIS

The court's holding in State v. Walden was based on the common law and the statutorily created duty that a parent must act
affirmatively to foresee when his child is in danger of being
harmed. 95 The legislature has attempted through the use of stat84. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 27 (4th ed. 1971).
85. Id.
86. State v. Liggett, 84 Ohio App. 225, 83 N.E.2d 663, 664 (1948); Commonwealth v. Kramer, 371 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Pa. Super. 1977).
87. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 12 (1978).
88. Convery v. Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250, 1252-53 (1978);
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 11 (1978).
89. In Re Zenick, 129 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ohio Juv. Ct. 1955).
90. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15 (1978).
91. 163 N.J. Super. at -, 394 A.2d at 1253; 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 144

(1978).
92. 163 N.J. Super. at

-,

394 A.2d at 1253.

93. Id., 394 A.2d at 1253-54.
94. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 56, 122 (4th ed. 1971).
95. 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981),
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/6
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utes to deter child abuse, 96 and the Walden court has tried to further this legislative intent by providing additional criminal sanctions and by imposing a stricter duty upon parents than that
previously found in North Carolina law. 97 Walden imposed felony
penalties for a parent's failure to act when the crime committed
upon the child was a felony. Previously in North Carolina the
mother in Walden would have only been civilly liable for such nonfeasance, 98 or only suffer punishment for a misdemeanor. 99 The
court stated that a parent's failure to intervene to prevent an assault upon his child will be construed as encouragement to the per-

petrator of the assault. 100 Thus the parent can be found guilty of
aiding and abetting in the assault, and convicted as a principal. 10 1
The court said that intervention would be required if reasonable
(the statute states that a parent who allows physical injury to be inflicted upon
his child is guilty of a misdemeanor.); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW at 597 (2d ed.
1969).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-316.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.4, 7A-543 (1981); § 110-116
(1978). (Under G.S. 110-116, now repealed, the legislative intent and purposes
were: The Legislature recognizes the growing problem of child abuse and neglect
and that children do not always receive appropriate care and protection from
their parents or other caretakers acting in loco parentis. The primary purpose of
requiring reports of child abuse and neglect is to identify any children suspected
to be neglected or abused and to assure that protective services will be made
available to such children and their families as quickly as possible to the end such
children will be protected, that further abuse or neglect will be prevented, and to
preserve the family life of the parties involved where possible by enhancing parental capacity for good child care.)
97. State v. Mapp, 45 N.C. App. 574, 581, 264 S.E.2d 348, 354 (1980). (In this
case the mother of a small child was convicted of second degree murder, child
abuse and child neglect, and the court of appeals upheld the conviction. The court
held that the parent failed to exercise reasonable diligence in the care of the child
as required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1, which makes the parent guilty of a
misdemeanor. But the court did not say that the parent is criminally liable for
failure to act when the child is in danger from a third person, because in this case
the parent herself committed the abuse.) State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 710, 94
S.E.2d 915, 922 (1956). (In this case the mother was found guilty of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill because the trial court found she had encouraged the perpetrator of the crime by laughing and cursing; the supreme court
reversed and remanded for a new trial, and did not discuss the parent's duty to
protect the child.)
98. State v. Reddish, 269 N.C. 246, 152 S.E.2d 89 (1967). (Civil negligence is
not enough to establish criminal responsibility.)
99. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981).
100. 306 N.C. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
101. Id. (Aiders and abettors are considered principals, and so are equally
guilty. State v. Small, 301 N.C. 407, 412, 272 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1980)).
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under the circumstances.10 2 Reasonableness is a jury question to be
determined upon the facts of each case. 103 The legislature provided
only a misdemeanor penalty for failure to act under similar circumstances.104 The felony child abuse sanction applies only when
the parent himself is the perpetrator of the abuse.0 5 The parent
thus must intervene to avoid felony penalties being imposed upon
him and to protect his child from harm by others.0 6 The parent
has always had a duty to protect his child from harm,'0 7 but now

he must act affirmatively to prevent such harm when he is aware of
the danger and present at the scene of the crime. 10 8 Thus the duty
of the parent to act is no greater than before, yet now, due to
Walden, the penalties for failure to act are more severe.
Walden expands the law of aiding and abetting in North Carolina by expressly stating that because of the legal duty a parent
owes to a child, a bystander parent can be charged as a principal
solely because he is present at the scene of the crime. 09 Before
Walden, the jury could find the defendant (parent) guilty only if it
found that the defendant said or did something showing his consent to the criminal purpose and contribution to its executive, but
now a parent's mere presence without opposing the crime may be
sufficient." 0 The failure of a parent who is present to take all reasonably possible steps to prevent his child from being assaulted by
another person is deemed consent by the parent to the crime."'
The jury may infer that the parent has consented to the crime and
need not inquire into how the silent parent's presence was viewed
by the perpetrator.' The law is expanded in that a bystander parent can no longer watch passively while his child is abused. In the
past in North Carolina, the parent only could not actively encourage the perpetrator, but now must actively discourage the
commission of the crime in order to avoid being charged with aid102. 306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786.

103. Id.
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4 (1981).
106. 306 N.C. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787.
107. In Re TenHoopen, 202 N.C. 223, 226-27, 162 S.E. 619, 620 (1932). (The
court held that a father has a duty to protect, maintain and educate his children.)
108. 306 N.C. 474, 293 S.E.2d 785.
109. Id. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 787. (The parent will be charged as a principal
if he fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm to his child.)
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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ing and abetting. The scope of the law is expanded in another
sense because the courts will no longer have to inquire into how
the bystander's presence is viewed by the perpetrator. The court
will merely assume that if the bystander is a parent and the victim
is his child, the parent's presence without protest or intervention is
consent to the crime by the actual perpetrator. Thus the parent
bystander no longer has a defense that the abuser was not encouraged in his commission of the crime by the parent's silent
presence at the scene.
The court did not discuss whether this holding will apply to
all cases where there is a legal duty to act. It appears that the
holding is limited to the facts of Walden, or at least to those situations where a parent fails to take affirmative steps to protect his
child from harm by a third person."' The court may have limited
its holding because traditionally the state and its agents have been
reluctant to interfere in the autonomy of the family.1 14 Parental
rights are given great deference, due to both the constitutionally
protected right of privacy, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the state's goal of protecting the
family entity as the basic unit of society.115 The state will interfere
with this family autonomy only when necessary to protect the welfare of a child, limiting the intrusion to what is necessary under
the circumstances."" If the court had attempted to expand the
scope of the Walden rule it might have intruded unnecessarily
upon the family. Such an intrusion might have occurred if it had
held that siblings have a similar legal duty towards each other.
Walden attempts to address an area not included in the legislation to date. The felony child abuse statute does not address a
parent's failure to act, yet a misdemeanor penalty may not be sufficient to do justice when serious harm has been done to a minor
child due to a negligent or unconcerned parent. The General Assembly's purpose in enacting the child abuse statutes was to deter
the rising incidences of such abuse.11 7 Parents have a right to pun113. Id.
114. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 15 (1978).
115. In Re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash. App. 637, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (1981); U.S.
CONST. amend, XIV, § 1.
116. In Re Surney, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d 108, 110 (1980); 67A C.J.S.
Parentand Child § 15 (1978).
117. The purpose is not stated in the current child abuse statutes but was
clearly stated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-116 (1978), repealed in 1979. See supra
note 96.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1983

13

428

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 6

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:415

ish their children, but this right is not unlimited, and if the punishment is unreasonable or excessive, it may constitute an assault
or a battery. 118 The state has a vital and legitimate interest in protecting its children from harm, and may act reasonably to further
this interest.'1 9 Because of this legitimate state interest, most
states have now enacted child abuse statutes with varying degrees
of penalties for such abuse.21 0 Many of these statutes are reporting
statutes. 2 ' The statutes require doctors who treat the children or
social service workers who are aware of the abuse to report the
matter to police or other authorities, who then act upon this information. The child abuse statutes imposing criminal penalties are
used only after an investigation of the complaint is made. 22 The
legislature realized that there was a need for harsher penalties
than those provided under the misdemeanor statute and so enacted the felony child abuse statute. 23 But the felony statute does
not deal with the fact situation that was before the Walden
court. 124 The court thus provided the necessary, more severe pun-

ishment for parents who allow their children to be abused. Now
parents can be held criminally liable for aiding and abetting a
third person who abuses their children merely by failing to intervene when they have reasonable opportunity to do so. By such failure they can receive several years in prison, which is not possible
under the North Carolina misdemeanor statute."2
The court could be accused of exceeding its authority by attempting to legislate. The General Assembly simply may not have
seen the need to impose a felony penalty for failure to act, al118. State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785, 788 (R.I. 1981); State v. Coombs, 381
A.2d 288, 289 (Me. 1978). (Excessive, immoderate corporal punishment may result
in criminal liability.)
119. In Re Sherol A. S., 581 P.2d 884, 888 (Okla. 1978); 43 C.J.S. Infants §§
92, 93 (1978).
120. Child Abuse and Neglect, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 §§ 2054, 2368 (Supp.
1982); IND. CODE § 31-6-11-3 (1980). (These two jurisdictions were chosen as representatives because of the large number of cases they have had on child abuse.)
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1981).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-318.2, 14-318.4 (1981).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4 (1981). (The problem was that the felony
child abuse elements did not always fit into the elements of other criminal
offenses.)
124. The felony child abuse statute only deals with the person who inflicts
the abuse upon the child, and in Walden the mother was not the actual perpetrator of the abuse.
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.2 (1981).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol5/iss2/6
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though it certainly recognized the need for harsher penalties when
more serious injuries are inflicted upon a minor child. 126 Courts
should not interfere in matters of family autonomy or make policy
on these matters, and any interference should come from the legislature. 12 7 But here the legislature had already made the policy decision that in certain cases the state would have to interfere in order to protect the health and welfare of its children. The Walden
court did not exceed its authority; it merely expanded the construction of the bystander exception to the general rule of aiding
and abetting. It is very important that parents not use their children as whipping posts, and a state should use all reasonable
means to alleviate such abuse.
Although the issue was not before the Walden court, it should
have discussed the parental privilege to punish and how this would
affect a parent's criminal liability in a similar case. Part of a parent's legal duty towards his child is to control the behavior of that
child, and in doing so a parent can inflict reasonable punishment
upon his child. 2 " But this parental privilege is lost and criminal
sanctions can be imposed when the parent goes beyond reasonable
punishment and inflicts serious or excessive abuse. 129 What is reasonable depends upon the circumstances, including the misconduct
being punished and the degree of harm done to the child.130 In
controlling their children, parents are permitted to do what would
otherwise be tortious conduct."' In addition, those persons standing in loco parentis have the right to inflict reasonable punishment
upon the child. 3 2 It seems obvious due to its length and severity
that the abuse inflicted upon the child in Walden was not reasonable punishment, no matter how seriously the child had misbehaved. Yet if the court had considered that the defendant was not
aware that Hoskins would be so abusive, the outcome of the case
might have been different. The court might not have found that
the defendant had totally neglected her parental duty, and thus
might have imposed a less severe sentence. The court's failure to
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4 (1981). See supra note 124.
127. Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476, 484, 189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972); Paige
v. Biry Const. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975).
128. State v. Liggett, 84 Ohio App. 225, 83 N.E.2d 663, 664 (1948); 67A C.J.S.
Parent and Child § 12 (1978).
129. People v. Jennings,

-

Colo.

-,

641 P.2d 276, 278 (1982).

130. Id.
131. Id.; Gibson v. Gibson, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648, 652 (1971).
132.

-

Colo. at

-,

641 P.2d at 278-79.
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deal with this question leaves the scope of Walden uncertain. Of
course if a parent knew that a third person was about to abuse his
child he would have to try to prevent it. But what consequences
will the parent suffer if he allows a stepparent or other to punish
the child and the punishment is abusive? Under the Walden holding it appears that at the moment the parent becomes aware of the
abuse he would be required to intervene, but this is not certain.
The effect of the criminal child abuse statute in curbing child
abuse is as yet unknown, but as shown through the rising number
of reported cases the problem continues. 3 3 Walden provides another means by which police and other state officials can act
against child abuse.
Because the issue of notification was not properly before the
court, Walden did not address how the proper authorities will be
notified of child abuse so that criminal charges may be brought
against the parent. This problem is addressed by the reporting
statute. 3. 4 But despite the reporting statute and Walden, it may be
very difficult to encourage family and friends to make complaints.
Although no one likes child abuse or encourages it, most people do
not want to report crimes committed by members of their own
family. One of the first things most children learn in school is not
to inform on their friends, and this credo is usually carried through
life. Only now the law is beginning to prompt such informing. It is
difficult to foresee whether society can overcome its reticence for
such conduct. Also, another problem may well come out of the encouragement to inform by the law. In theory it would be a very
positive development if people watched their neighbors to guarantee that they were not hurting each other. But as with all good
things, such surveillance can be carried too far. Does society want
to become a nation of watchdogs? Is the law encouraging the first
steps toward an Orwellian society, with Big Brother watching? The
legislature could partially remedy the problems, at least in the area
of child abuse, by expanding the reporting statutes and providing a
penalty for those who fail to report suspected child abuse. This
solution might lead us towards Big Brother, but the problem of
child abuse must be dealt with in whatever manner available. Perhaps the problem should also be publicized, so that family and
friends will be aware that it can happen in any family.
Under Walden a parent must act when he has a reasonable
133. See Appendix
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1981).
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opportunity to do so, but the court stated that this did not mean
that parents have a legal duty to place themselves in danger of
death or great bodily harm.13 5 The court did not precisely define
what lengths the parents must go to to protect his children from
abuse by a third person. It did say that what is reasonable will be a
question for the jury. 3 6
Under the criminal law, a parent has a duty to protect his children from unlawful attack. 1

7

The amount of force he can use is

limited to what is necessary to stop the attack. 38 Yet the law does
not specify how much force the parent must use. In dealing with
the failure to act in general, the law says that one is not criminally
liable for such failure when he is physically incapable of performing, but a parent may have to take a greater chance with his own
life to save his child.3 9 Under tort law a parent is not guility of
contributory negligence if he fails to exercise extraordinary precautions to guard his child from danger. 140 When Walden is considered in light of these authorities, it appears that the parent of a
child in danger of being abused by a third person may have to do
everything that he is physically able to do, in order for a jury to
find that he acted reasonably under the circumstances. The court
may have intended the parent to use extreme force to prevent the
abuse if the parent was faced with the use of extreme force upon
his child. To avoid the imposition of a criminal penalty for failure
to intervene, the parent must attempt to prevent the abuse by
whatever means are best suited to the circumstances.
CONCLUSION

In State v. Walden, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that if a parent who is present fails to take all steps reasonably
possible to protect his child from abuse by another, the parent has
shown his consent and contribution to the crime. Thus the parent
may be found guilty as an aider and abettor and convicted as a
principal to the crime committed. Walden imposes an affirmative
duty upon the parent to do something to prevent the crime or he
may be guilty of a felony. Prosecutors can now charge parents who
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

306 N.C. at 475, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
Id. at 476, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW at 1018-19 (2d ed. 1969).
Id. at 1013.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26, at 189 (1972).
67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 144 (1978).
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fail to intervene with a felony which was previously not possible
under the current child abuse felony statute. 4 '
Walden expands the exception to the general rule that mere
presence at the scene of the crime can be seen as encouragement of
the perpetrator only when the bystander is aware that the perpetrator views his presence as such encouragement, 42 and is the first
case in North Carolina to do so in the area of child abuse. The
court in Walden addressed an area neglected by the legislature
when they enacted the child abuse statutes. Questions remain as to
whether the holding will be an effective deterrent of child abuse
and whether the parent must assume great personal risk to protect
his child to avoid criminal liability. A question also remains as to
whether it is desireable to create a nation of informants. Walden
had added to the means by which the state can prosecute child
abusers and those parents who allow the abuse, thus helping in the
battle against child abuse. Walden has expanded the duty of a parent towards his child. Parents can no longer passively watch as
their children are abused by others, and expect to escape with only
a slap on the wrist.
Janet Coleman

141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4 (1981).
142. State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 721, 224 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1976).
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APPENDIX

NUMBER OF CHILDREN REPORTED TO THE NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL REGISTRY
(Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting Law passed 1971.)
Neglected

Abused
Reported

Confirmed

Reported

Confirmed

Total

Both N & A
Reported

Confirmed*

Reported

Deaths:

A

N

A/N

Confirmed

July 1, 1971-June 30, 1972
1100

657

5775

3740

6875

4397

25

3

10064

6097

10

13

11278

5635

8

11

11277

5774

13968

6273

4

9

15511

6354

8

2

18686

7438

7

5

20204

8623

4

6

25994

10891

6

7

3

27518

11421

6

4

2

26981

10961

4

5

4

July 1, 1972-June 30, 1973
1602

746

8462

5351
July 1, 1973-June 30, 1974

1900

711

9572

4987
July 1,1974-June 30, 1975

1946

1050

9331

4724

13 12

July 1, 1975-June 30, 1976
2112

1068

10547

4984

1309

221

July 1, 1976-June 30, 1977
2180

987

9415

5047

3916

320

July 1, 1977-June 30, 1978
3426

1389

13265

5267

1989

780

July 1, 1978-June 30, 1979
3589

1548

14505

6175

2110

900

July 1, 1979-June 30, 1980
4831

1910

18452

7855

2711

1126

July 1. 1980-June 30, 1981
5093

1963

19970

8451

2454

1007

July 1, 1981-June 30, 1982
5301

1956

19417

8141

2263

864

* Category of Both Neglect and Abuse added 12-1-75.
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